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NORTH KOREA AND THE MADONNA OF CZESTOCHOWA
THE HON. MICHAEL KIRBY AC CMG*
The intervention of  the  Madonna of  Czestochowa,  one of  the  many patron  saints  of  the
Roman Catholic Church in Poland, in my recent work for the United Nations on North Korea,
would seem, on the face of things, to be a little far-fetched.
In the first place, I had never heard of the Madonna and certainly did not direct any specific
entreaties to her. 
More to the point, I doubt that the Madonna had heard anything about me or my work. We
had never been in communication, by prayer, thought or in any other way.
Moreover, my upbringing was in the stern Protestant tradition of Christianity. The Anglican
Church, into which I was confirmed, is (at least in its Sydney Diocese) an adherent to the
Protestant side of Anglicanism. Notions of intersession to the Madonna would generally be
regarded in that Church as heretical. The Marian tradition of Christianity is more common in
the Roman and Orthodox Churches. For Protestants, the creation of a special significance for
Mary, the Madonna, is generally regarded as erroneous and unbiblical. In its more extreme
forms,  it  appears  to  elevate  Mary  to  be  a  kind  of  goddess.  At  least,  that  is  how many
Protestants would view prayers to the Madonna. 
* Chair of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (2013-14).
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Some Protestant Christians are even so unkind as to suggest that the elevation of Mary to a
seemingly  quasi-divine  status  was  an  outgrowth  from the  equally  unsound  doctrine  that
priests had to be unmarried (a view that Martin Luther rejected in theory and practice five
hundred years ago) or that only men could be priests (a source of conflict right up to the
present time).
Nevertheless, when I heard of the Madonna of Czestochowa, I was prepared to feel very
grateful to her for her suggested intervention in my cause. Certainly, I needed all the help I
could secure.
In March 2013, at its 22nd Session, the United Nations Human Rights Council established a
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s  Republic of Korea
(DPRK).1 The mandate for this body was provided by the Human Rights Council’s resolution
22/13. It required the COI to investigate ‘the systematic, widespread and grave violation of
human  rights  in  the  DPRK with  a  view to  ensuring  full  accountability,  in  particular  for
violations that may amount to crimes against humanity’. 
The  adoption  of  the  resolution,  and  even  the  prospect  that  such  a  resolution  would  be
adopted, was unknown to me when it occurred. However, as I now know, it was strongly
supported  at  the  time  by a  number  of  international  human  rights  organisations  based  in
Geneva. Those organisations included Human Rights Watch (HRW), a global international
human rights body with its headquarters in New York. HRW was one of the main civil society
actors pressing for the adoption of the resolution. An important voice of HRW was Juliette de
Rivero,2 a senior human rights officer. Although I did not know this at the time, the adoption
of the resolution creating the COI and its mandate occurred in an unusual way. 
1 The report of the Commission of Inquiry of the Human Rights Council on Human Rights Violations in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) made public on 7 February 2014 (UN document 
A/HRC/25/CRP.1. It was formally delivered to the Human Rights Council in Geneva on 7 March 2014. After an 
Arria briefing given to interested members, the report was the cause for the addition of the situation in DPRK to 
the agenda of the Security Council. The story of the strong and affirmative response of the United Nations 
organisation at every level is told in M.D. Kirby, “The United Nations Report on North Korea and the Security 
Council: Interface of Security and Human Rights” (2015) 89 Australian Law Journal 714, 721-9.
2 Then Geneva Advocacy Director at Human Rights Watch.
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The establishment of any COI is a significant scaling-up of the seriousness that is attached to
human rights violations on a theme, or by a country, that is the focus of the COI mandate.
Normally, the suggestion that such a body should be created, and mandate given, is hotly
contested in the deliberations of the Human Rights Council. Unusually – indeed uniquely –
this did not happen in the case of the proposal for a COI on DPRK when it was made. 
In the chair  at  the time that the proposal was presented on 21 March 2013 was the then
President of the Human Rights Council, Ambassador Remigiusz Henczel of Poland. When he
called forward the draft  resolution,  including its  proposal for the creation of the COI on
DPRK, and placed it before the Council for a vote, it is clear from the sound recording of the
proceedings that he was surprised at the silence that ensued. He repeated his call, in case any
delegate amongst the member states might wish to call  for a vote on the subject,  as had
previously invariably been the case. In the event, despite this repeated call, no voice was
raised to demand a vote. The decision was therefore declared ‘adopted’ on the voices, with no
country then recording its opposition or abstention.
The reason why this was unusual, even in the case of DPRK which had many critics in the
Council and in the world, was that many member states of the Council oppose in principle
the creation of mandates nominating particular countries that might become the subject of
investigation by a COI on human rights. In the case of some countries it is important for their
own self-interest to oppose the creation of any “country specific COI”. They complain this
involves “finger-pointing” at particular countries. They assert that this endangers that new
approach  established  by  the  Human  Rights  Council,  to  replace  the  deep  divisions  and
suggested failures of the previous Human Rights Commission.  These views were later to
emerge in response to the report of the COI on DPRK. Countries that could not point to any
error of substance or procedure in the COI’s report or approach nonetheless resisted action on
the  report  and  its  recommendations  because  it  was  the  product  of  a  “country-specific”
investigation.
Yet despite frequent objections of this kind, no country raised its voice in opposition to the
establishment of the COI on DPRK. Ambassador Henczel declared the motion adopted. He
then moved on to the next item in the agenda. 
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Soon after this happened, in mid-April 2013, I was attending a conference of statisticians at
Herstmonceux Castle in the South of England. North Korea and its human rights record were
furthest from my mind. However, during the conference I received a telephone call from the
office of the then Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Senator the Honourable Bob Carr).
The caller enquired as to whether I would be prepared to permit my name to go forward for
selection  as  chair  of  a  new  COI  of  the  Human  Rights  Council,  which  had  just  been
established to address alleged human rights violations in North Korea. After consulting my
partner  to  secure  agreement,  I  passed  a  message  to  the  Australian  Government  in  the
affirmative. I then returned to the statisticians and put the possibility of an engagement with
the people of Korea entirely out of my mind. 
Between 1993-6 I had served on a human rights mandate that reported to the then Human
Rights  Commission of the United Nations in Geneva and to the Third Committee of the
General Assembly in New York. I knew from that experience that appointments and election
to such offices were often contested, always sensitive and sometimes disputable. I played no
part in advocating my merits or lobbying those who would have the final decision (whoever
those persons might be).
In the case of my mandate in 1993, this involved appointment by the then Secretary-General
of the United Nations (Boutros Boutros-Ghali) to the office of his Special Representative on
Human Rights in Cambodia. That office had been contemplated by the Paris Peace Accords.
Those treaties, which were signed in Paris in 1991, brought an end to the military conflict
over Kampuchea/Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge regime continued to enjoy accreditation to
the United Nations seat in the name of Kampuchea until ousted by a military intervention led
by forces from Vietnam in December 1978.
I  knew, on that occasion,  that I was not the first  choice for appointment to the office of
Special Representative. This had been His Excellency, Judge Kéba Mbaye, a distinguished
Senegalese lawyer and a Judge at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, later that
Court’s Vice-President. In the 1980s I had worked with him in UNESCO and admired him
greatly.
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I knew nothing about the mysterious events that led to my being offered appointment on
Cambodia in the place of Judge Mbaye. As rumour had it, he requested provision of first class
air  travel  to  proceed from Senegal  or  The Hague to  the duties  in  faraway Cambodia.  In
fairness, Judge Mbaye was a man of substantial stature, in more ways than one. Objectively,
his request for comfortable air travel, in order to assume an additional (and prospectively
unpleasant) function might not have been unreasonable in his case. Moreover, he had then
recently been serving as a member of the International Olympics Committee (IOC). That
body provided its  members  with  first  class  international  air  travel.  However,  the  United
Nations was not blessed with resources in the same way as the IOC. Under its protocols, only
the Secretary-General travelled first class. Other officers had to make do, according to rank
and duration of the journey, with business class or economy class.
Whether this was the true explanation of Judge Mbaye’s passing up the appointment to the
Cambodian  function,  I  cannot  say.  His  international  appointment  and distinction  and his
command of the French language were undoubtedly attributes that gave him the edge on me.
Cambodia,  in  colonial  times,  had  been  a  protectorate  of  the  French  Republic.  It  was  a
member of Francophonie, the global community of French-speaking nations. France took a
special interest in Cambodia’s affairs, as symbolised by the fact that it had convened the Paris
Peace  conference,  resulting  in  an  agreement  that  included  the  requirement  to  appoint  a
Special  Representative  of  the  Secretary-General  to  monitor  and  report  on  human  rights
following  the  conclusion  of  the  work  of  the  United  Nations  Transitional  Authority  for
Cambodia (UNTAC). 
Whatever the negotiations and background, I was appointed by Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in 1993. I worked closely with his office, and in particular with the British-
born under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr (later Sir) Marrack Goulding. I also
worked closely with excellent  colleagues in  what  was then the United Nations Office of
Human Rights. These colleagues included Mr John Pace (Officer in Charge), Mr Jose Gomez
del  Prado (Chief  Officer),  Mr Daniel  Prémont (Head of  the Office for  Human Rights in
Phnom Penh),  and Mr Christoph Peschoux (Chief Investigative Officer).  From these fine
United Nations  officers I  learned much about  how to discharge a United Nations human
rights  mandate.  They  helped  me  in  the  preparation  of  my  reports.  They  made  useful
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suggestions concerning my oral reports to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva and the
Third Committee of the General Assembly in New York. 
I discharged my duties in the mandate, as I believe, to the satisfaction of the United Nations.
Substantially  I  wrote  my own reports.  This  was  itself  unusual  for  human  rights  special
rapporteurs and special representatives. I only retired from the position after I was appointed
a Justice of the High Court of Australia with effect from February 1996. During that service,
until 2009, for Australian constitutional reasons, I was unavailable for further appointment to
discharge a United Nations Human Rights mandate. 
Nevertheless, between excellent training and preparation, skills and talent, and appointment
to a United Nations mandate lie many obstacles and impediments. I knew of these (and I was
later to learn of them again). That is why I put the approach to me in connection with North
Korea out of my mind.
Then, in early May 2013, I was informed that the President of the Human Rights Council,
who was still Ambassador Henczel of Poland, had appointed me to be a member of the COI
on DPRK, and its chairman. The then current Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in DPRK
(Mr Marzuki Darusman, Indonesia)3 was  ex officio a member of the COI according to the
uncontested resolution of the Human Rights Council. President Henczel announced that the
third member of the COI would be Ms Sonja Biserko, an experienced civil society expert
from Serbia, with extensive experience in relation to the ‘crimes against humanity’ that had
occurred in the former states of Yugoslavia. She was also an expert on the international crime
of ‘genocide’ and had strong connections to international civil society as well as academic
and professional experts on the crimes that were to become the focus of the COI on DPRK.
The  expertise  of  the  other  two  members  of  the  COI  on  DPRK  was  therefore  easily
established. But what of my own qualifications? And why was I appointed and designated
chairman? This is where the Madonna of Czestochowa came in. 
3 Mr. Darusman was a member of the U.N. commission investigating human rights violations in North Korea 
that released its report in February 2014 strongly condemning the human rights situation in North Korea.
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After the announcement of my appointment was made on 7 May 2013, I soon afterwards
travelled to Europe for other purposes. I offered to divert from my journey to proceed to
Geneva  in  order  to  have  early  consultations  with  officers  of  the  Office  of  the  High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Those consultations took place, but they were
not extended. A short interval was set aside for me to meet in the Avenue Motta office of the
OHCHR. Over a cup of coffee, I discussed the background of the mandate and the hopes
which the COI had engendered with Juliette de Rivero, whom I met for the first time. 
I questioned her concerning her knowledge of the reasons why I was appointed. She was
vague but mentioned the suggested good opinion that the then High Commissioner, Judge
Navi Pillay,4 from South Africa, had concerning my judicial work in Australia. In that work I
had  repeatedly  upheld  the  interaction  between  common  law  principles,  statutory
interpretation and universal human rights law.5 I was satisfied with the explanation and again
put the matter out of my mind. 
The first formal meeting of the members of the COI took place in Geneva on 1-5 July 2013.
It was an intensely busy one because we had not only to plan the conduct of our inquiry but
to determine a number of controversial preliminary questions governing the methodology of
the COI. Shortly, we resolved to undertake our inquiry in a distinctive way utilising public
hearings, engagement with the media, use of the internet and emphasis on transparency, the
provision of due process and engagement with civil society.
Late in the first week of our meetings together, the commissioners met Juliette de Rivero in a
social  setting  and  sought  to  learn  about  the  civil  society  organisations  which  had  been
engaged with DPRK issues for a long time; including HRW and Citizens’ Alliance on North
Korean Human Rights.
Juliette de Rivero told me that, in order to secure my appointment to the position of Chairman
of the COI on DPRK, she had felt obliged to appeal to ‘higher powers’. She was not religious
at all herself. But she admitted that she had sought the intervention of the Black Madonna of
4 Navi Pillay is a South African jurist who served as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
from 2008 to 2014. A South African of Indian Tamil origin, she was the first non-white woman judge of the 
High Court of South Africa.
5 See e.g. Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 at 617 ff [512] ff; cf 586-595 [41]-[73]: [2004] HCA 37.
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Czestochowa. With this, she produced a small laminated image showing a Madonna with
child. Both the Madonna and the child shown in the image reflected a dark skin colour which
contrasted with the vivid golden halo that was painted to surround their heads. She pressed
the laminated image into my hand, urging me to keep it with me throughout the enquiry.
While she was not particularly religious herself, ‘in the circumstances’ she thought that this
might be a good idea. She told me that her friend and colleague, Joanna Hosaniak of Citizens’
Alliance, could explain to me the appeal to ‘higher powers’. I was intrigued with her story.
When I  first  met  Joanna Hosaniak,  I  invited  her  to  tell  me who the  Black Madonna of
Czestochowa was and how she came to be involved in the COI on DPRK. 
Soon after that, I met Joanna at a public meeting held by the COI in the CBD of Seoul. This
was attended by many civil society organisations, their supporters and officials. I became
aware that Joanna was of Polish extraction. This meant that she would bring to the table her
own knowledge about the Communist regime in Poland before the fall of the Berlin Wall. I
told her of my conversation with Juliette de Rivero and produced the image of the Black
Madonna.
“Who is the Black Madonna?”, I asked.
“And why was it necessary to resort to ‘higher powers’, in getting the COI constituted?” 
Joanna Hosaniak protested that she also was not particularly religious.  However,  like her
friend Juliette de Rivero, she had been engaged in energetic lobbying both to ensure the COI
would be established and that I would be appointed to it. 
Upon reflection, perhaps energetic lobbying understates the significance of the role Joanna
undertook with others, especially Juliette De Rivero and Phil Robertson6 in the establishment
of the COI and it is important that I acknowledge this at this time and also thank Joanna who
has  provided  considerable  background  to  the  establishment  of  the  COI  before  I  further
discuss the significance of the role of the Black Madonna upon my appointment.
For many years the North Korea issue has certainly been of concern to a number of human
rights organisations including Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Citizens’ Alliance and North
Korean Human Rights and Conectas Human Rights from Brazil. It was well known that the
6 Deputy Director HRW Asian Division.
8
idea of a COI into human rights in the DPRK needed to be approached strategically as it was
believed the creation of the Commission would not develop without determined and resolute
advocacy.  As  Joanna  has  noted  this  was  difficult  as  Citizens  Alliance  did  not  have  any
support for advocacy work because many donors did not appreciate the importance of the
establishment of the COI at the time. 
Since 2002, Citizens’ Alliance (CA) had been going to Geneva yearly to advocate and build
greater support amongst the countries for the North Korea Resolution. However, it was not
until  2010  that  HRW in  Geneva  joined  as  a  main  partner  in  organising  these  meetings.
Support for the establishment of a COI was lacking with some parties actively opposed to the
formation of a COI. Subsequently in November of 2011, Citizens Alliance held conferences
in  cooperation  with  HRW and  Concetas  Human  Rights  in  Geneva  (CHR),  to  acquaint
diplomats and UN officials with the need for the creation of the COI. 
In 2012, in Jakarta, Julie De Rivero and Phil Robertson considered that the time to strongly
argue for the creation of the COI was auspicious due to the fact that both China and Russia
would not be sitting on the Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2013. Joanna further noted
that during this time CA, HRW and CHR met with the  U.N. special rapporteur on North
Korea,  Marzuki  Darusman, and  promised  him that  full  responsibility  would  be  taken  in
assisting him and the Commission if the call for establishments of the COI succeeded. Julie
De Rivero assisted in ensuring that Marzuki’s report would be significant in calling for the
establishment of the COI. In December 2012 Julie De Rivero, with the assistance of Joanna
(also  Deputy  Director  General  Citizen’s  Alliance  for  North  Korea  on  Human  Rights),
facilitated a meeting between Citizens’ Alliance and Navi Pillay and organised for the High
Commissioner’s press office to issue a public statement after the meeting.  I am informed that
Citizens’ Alliance brought  two survivors of political  prison camps in  North Korea to  the
meeting.  Citizens’  Alliance  considered  that  the  statement  from  Navi  Pillay  would  be
influential in convincing states of the need for a COI.
Navi  Pillay’s  public  statement  was  made  in  January  2013,  giving  Citizens’ Alliance  1.5
months  to start  drafting the Resolution and convince the states.  Following this,  lobbying
activities  were  commenced by HRW in  countries  where  they  had field  offices;  Julie  De
Rivero from the HRW Geneva office, the HRW New York and Brussels offices and Joanna
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Hosaniak in Seoul. The problem was that although some EU missions in Geneva gave the
green light for a COI, the same EU missions in South Korea were blocking it because many
of them had also been in charge of North Korean affairs. Additionally, the South Korean
government was proving to be an obstacle. This was difficult. At the time the Presidential
Office was undergoing transition with the election of President Park Geun-hye, and Citizens’
Alliance was experiencing trouble with the South Korean Blue House7 and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Without tacit approval from South Korea, other states made it clear that it
would be difficult to support the call for a COI. 
A breakthrough occurred when Julie De Rivero was able to secure Japanese support for a
COI, whilst they were drafting the March resolution at the Human Rights Council, during a
visit organised by the Japanese Division of HRW. Kanae Doi,8 from the Japanese division,
was critical in convincing relatives of abduction victims in Japan that a COI would not be an
obstacle  to  their  hope of  resolving the issue bilaterally  between Japan and North  Korea.
Afterwards Citizens’ Alliance was able to convince EU States, especially missions in Seoul
(particularly UK, the Netherlands, and France) and the EU Commission to support the call for
a COI. 
The next issue was to get the right people on the COI and a Chair who was “strong and
charismatic”. Citizens’ Alliance recommended Sonka Biserko as Chair. I am informed that
HRW strongly supported my appointment.
Following this, Joanna Hosaniak was in Geneva to continue to support the COI during final
drafting, organise parallel meetings in Geneva with the states in February and March of 2014
and to contact missions drafting the resolution after the COI’s report was published. This was
all done in partnership between Human Rights Watch and Citizens Alliance for North Korean
Human Rights. 
Even after the COI published its report the work was not over. CA, CHR and HRW had to
make  sure  that  the  findings  in  the  report  would  be  reflected  in  the  Resolution.  Joanna
organised the special meeting with the EU states in Seoul and invited Julie de Rivero because
7 The Blue House is the executive office and official residence of the South Korean head of state. 
8 Kanae Doi, HRW Japan Director, works to encourage the Japanese Government to prioritize human rights in 
its foreign and domestic policies and practices.
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she feared many states would be reluctant to the call for ICC referral, especially those that
had a strong humanitarian presence in North Korea. They also made an early call upon Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea (ROK) to request that the ROK government
invited the UN field office to Seoul (the Minister opposed that idea during the meeting). After
the Resolution was passed in March 2013 and the ROK government officially rejected it,
Citizens Alliance organised public and media campaigns, mobilising civil society in Seoul to
criticise the government. Finally the government reversed its position. A campaign was also
planned for New York to  prepare for the General  Assembly and the ground for possible
official briefings at the Security Council. Param Preet-Singh,9 HRW in New York, contacted
states to get them on board to co-sponsor the meeting at the ECOSOC Council10 (Australia,
Panama, and Botswana).  Joanna and Param continued the advocacy by bringing in North
Korean  victims  and  focusing  on  abstaining  states  and  states  that  were  non-permanent
members of the Security Council so that the briefing could be held in December of 2013. 
In her correspondence to me Joanna Hosaniak comments:
I could write a book of what happened in between, while preparing for the COI, during the 
COI’s operation and after.
The above comments relating to the creation of the COI do not do justice to the monumental
task in establishing the COI and the commitment and passion of others. It is clear that the
COI  would  not  have  come  about  except  for  a  number  of  dedicated  individuals  and
organisations who cared about human rights generally and the plight of victims in North
Korea in particular. 
In returning to the role of the Black Madonna with respect to my appointment, in the days
before the names of the appointees were announced, things did not appear to be going in the
right direction, according to the rumours circulating in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. It
was at that point that Juliette de Rivero decided to go to the top, literally. She knew that
Joanna’s mother was religious because she had spoken about her from time to time. To fend
9 Param-Preet Singh is Associate Director in the International Justice Program of HRW in New York. Her work 
focuses on pressing for credible national and international justice for those suspected of committing war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide. She is also chair of Human Rights Watch's Fellowship Program.
10 The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is one of the six main organs of the United Nation (Art. 7, 
Charter of the UN).The main task of the ECOSOC is to promote economic and social development. The 
promotion of human rights is of significant importance for it.
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off  a  bad  outcome in  respect  of  the  COI or  its  appointees,  Juliette  resolved  that  it  was
essential to invoke Joanna’s mother’s assistance. So Juliette asked Joanna if she could contact
her mother to seek divine intervention, to ensure that the appointment process would proceed
in the right direction.
Joanna went on:
I honestly laughed at the time and told Juliette that all would be fine. But I was not so sure
that  this  was  necessarily  so.  So,  to  be  sure  of  a  clear  conscience  and  that  I  had  done
everything that I could, I telephoned my mother that night in Poland. I told my mother about
Juliette’s  request.  My mother  was touched by the request,  so much so that  the next  day,
accompanied by my father, she set out by train to travel to Czestochowa. This was a distance
of 200 kms. But it was necessary because, in my mother’s view, the best intervention we
could  hope  for  was  by  the  Black  Madonna  of  Our  Lady  of  Czestochowa.  My  father
accompanied my mother on the journey. After arriving at the church in Czestochowa, where
the image of the Madonna was on display, these two old people spent the night in the chapel
praying for the success of the COI to bring justice to the people of North Korea. And for your
selection to head the inquiry. 
I had never met Joanna still less her mother and father. Joanna, fulfilled her part. And so, it
appears at the time of these prayers, did her parents. When, on the following day, the creation
of the COI and my appointment to chair it were announced, Juliette de Rivero exclaimed,
‘Perhaps it was the intervention of your mother’s prayers.’
Certainly the course of events bore the hallmark of a little help from ‘higher powers’.
As I listened to this story I was, of course, polite, although my Protestant background made
me hugely sceptical about this story. Joanna seemed certain that it was her mother’s prayers
that had delivered the appointment to me. And that this was what was meant to be.
Often as we laboured over the difficult and upsetting investigations that resulted in the report
of the COI on DPRK on 7 February 2014, I thought of the Black Madonna. I am not as
convinced as others might be that I owe my appointment to her intervention. Just the same, I
placed  the  laminated  image  of  the  Black  Madonna on the  front  of  my  desk  in  Sydney,
Australia. As I looked at the image, she sometimes seemed to smile at me. 
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So far, because of international power play and the inevitable politics of such matters, we
have not  been able to  produce outcomes that  implement  all,  or  even most,  of the COI’s
recommendations on human rights violations, described in the COI report. Yet God, we are
told, moves in mysterious ways. The achievement of relief from the dire situation described
in the report on North Korea is an important moral obligation of the United Nations and the
international community. We all know this. The DPRK knows it. And doubtless the Black
Madonna of Czestochowa knows it best of all.
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